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1. Introduction 
While there is no shortage of works devoted to the use of comparative law 
by European Community institutions, and in particular by the European Court of 
Justice, 1 reflections devoted to the problems involved in comparisons between 
national and EC law have remained extremely rare.2 Yet, there are well-known 
examples of this kind of comparative works. Most scholars interested in 
Community law are familiar with books such as Stein and Sandalow's Courts 
and Free Markets or Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler's Integration through 
Law, the primary aim of which is an assessment of the operation of the 
Community in the light of the American experience. Other studies attempt to 
import into Community law some of the lessons derived from the analysis of 
national legal systems) 
Should we then take the relative scarcity of methodological reflexions as a 
clue that this kind of exercise does not involve specific difficulties? I think not. 
Indeed, the thrust of this paper is that there are methodological difficulties 
linked to such cross-level comparisons, dnd that their neglect has been the 
source of misunderstandings or of hidden bias in quite a few analyses. I shall 
also argue that these problems are of considerable importance, as there appears 
to be a growing need for comparisons embracing elements of national and EC 
law. Before addressing these methodological difficulties, it is therefore 
* 
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appropriate to dwell for a moment on the reasons that may lead one to venture 
into comparisons of this kind. 
2. Why Compare? 
Most comparative law textbooks devote at least one section to the objectives 
and functions of comparative legal research. While it would be superfluous to 
here enter into a detailed examination of this issue, I should point out that most 
of the reasons traditionally invoked to explain the utility of comparative analysis 
apply with particular cogency to the study of EC law, and should lead us to 
compare elements of Community law with national equivalents. 
Thus, it is often argued that a comparative approach may enable lawyers to 
gain a deeper understanding of the problems they face in their own legal system. 
This seems quite true in the case of the Community, as many Community law 
rules find their origin in similar provisions of domestic law. The French 
contentieux administratif inspired many EC law remedies,4 while antitrust 
procedures were patterned on the American model.5 The European Court of 
Justice's jurisprudence on basic principles is often informed by national legal 
traditions.6 As is well known, this kind of legal transplant is even mandated by 
the Treaty itself as regards the Community's extra-contractual liability (Article 
215). In all these cases, a comparative analysis may shed interesting light on 
Community law rules. 
The reverse is of course equally true. With the revival of European 
integration in the 1980s, national policies have become increasingly 
"communitarized",7 and a growing number of national provisions are of 
Community origin. As a result, in areas like competition law, company law or 
even tax law, it has become almost impossible to dispense with the study of the 
relevant Community provisions. Even a discipline like constitutional law, which 
had been shaped by national history and traditions, has been affected by 
Community membership. The Maastricht Treaty, with its provisions on electoral 
rights of European citizens, has only made apparent a process of 
"rapprochement constitutionnel" which had been initiated by the European 
Court of Justice.8 The national and Community legal systems are now so closely 
intertwined that one notices many instances of institutional osmosis: principles 
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nd institutions borrowed from national traditions are incorporated in ~ommunity rules and at times travel back, be it in a modified form, to the 
national level, as part of the Court's jurisprudence.9 
This brings us to another traditional argument in favour of compa:~tiv~ legal 
research, namely the role of comparison as an instrument of the umficatwn of 
law. In this context, comparative legal research has been regarded as a 
prerequisite of the unification process. Comparison ~as seen as necessary to 
work out the similarities and differences between natwnallega~ struc~res, a~d 
to identify common, or even ideal, solutions. Althou_gh qmte logical, t~Is 
approach has only occasionally been f~llowed b~ natiOnal and ~ommumty 
experts, who are traditionally more anxwus to s~nke a compro~mse betw~e~ 
contrasting national interests than to work out an Ideal-type solutiOn. E':en tf It 
does not play the crucial role in the harmonization process that comparatlv~ law 
theory would recommend,10 comparativ_e research ~onetheless remams a 
valuable analytical instrument, as the resultmg Commumty norm often borrows 
elements from national provisions. We will see further that recent developments 
in harmonization policy have enhanced the practical relevance of such an 
approach. 
Comparative analysis may also play a useful role as an inst:nme~t of legal 
reform. Many comparative projects are motivated by the consideratiOn ~hat a 
given t:K problem is common to different l~gal orders, and_ that a~ evaluatiOn of 
their respective solutions may be useful m order to deCI_de wht~h should _be 
given preference. Although it will be argued later that this ex~rci~e may giVe 
rise to specific problems, there is little doubt that the reasomng IS gen~rally 
valid as regards the Community legal order. To mention but one example, It h_as 
become commonplace to refer to the "demvcracy deficit" that is allege? to exist 
at the Community level. But the reality of such a deficit, a~d th~ potential J?e~s 
to redress it, can only be assessed by reference to the SituatiOn that exists I_n 
domestic legal systems. Yet, oddly enough, to my knowledge, no such analysis 
has ever been conducted in a systematic fashion. 
This latter example illustrates another advantage of comparative research, 
namely its potential to test the scholar's worki_ng ~ypothesis. I_t has of~e~ been 
argued that comparative research plays a function m human sciences similar to 
that of laboratories in natural sciences.l1 This is particularly true of legal 
research. As no laboratories are available to test the wisdom of lawyers' 
intuitions, comparative or historical approaches are about the ~mly methods 
available to those who want to go beyond the level of mere deduction. 
9 The phenomenon has been described by Koopmans, "European Public Law: Reality and 
Prospects", Public Law (1991) 53. 
10 See the disappointed comments of Constantinesco, supra note 1 at 353. 
11 Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", American Political 
Science Review (1971) 682 at 684-5. 
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This remark is hardly new. Yet the concern for empirical research does not 
seem to have played as important a role in Community law as it has in other 
branches of law. This may be due, at least in part, to the object of the study, as 
scholarly analyses of European integration are often "burdened with 
understandably emotive and ideological prejudices",l2 to which many lawyers 
more or less consciously adhered - at least until recently. As Martin Shapiro 
once wrote, in many Community law works, 
"the Community [is presented] as a juristic idea; the written constitution as a sacred text; 
the professional commentary as a legal truth; the case law as the inevitable working out of 
the correct implications of the constitutional text; and the constitutional court as the 
disembodied voice of right reason and constitutional theology. "13 
The charge may seem cruel but it is not unfounded. Many Community law 
scholars seem to have overlooked that law is not merely a technique, but also a 
social instrument used to solve a given problem, and that the object of legal 
analysis is not only to make sense of the technical subtleties of the legal rule, 
but also to provide, whenever possible, an evaluation of its performance in 
solving this societal problem. In many respects, the situation of Community 
lawyers is similar to that of a scholar who would have confined himself to the 
study of his domestic legal system. Comparative research, with its corollary of 
relativism, may help him to challenge the assumptions rooted in his own legal 
system and counteract the "tendency to ultra-sophisticated analysis and quasi-
scholasticism which arises when generations of scholars continue to examine the 
same fundamental documents within a purely national context".l4 In other 
words, one could argue that comparative research is indispensable if 
Community law is to move to a more advanced level of scholarship. 
To illustrate this point, let us return for a moment to the example of the 
democracy deficit. The classical argument is that, because of the limited power 
enjoyed by the European Parliament, decision-making in the European 
Community has so far been insufficiently democratic. The whole reasoning 
therefore rests on two implicit - but nevertheless very clear - assumptions; 
namely that in other political systems, parliaments do play a central role in 
decision making, and that in doing so, they effectively act in favor of citizen's 
interests. Are these assumptions founded? A glance at Western Europe is 
sufficient to realize that in quite a few systems, the role of Parliament is largely 
12 Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler, "Introduction", in M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe, J. 
Weiler, Introduction through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience, Vol.I (1986) at 6. 
13 "Comparative Law and Comparative Politics", 53 University of Southern California Law 
Review (1980) 537, at 538. 
14 De Witte, "The European Dimension of Legal Education", Draft Report for the Society 
of Public Teachers of Law Conference on 'Reviewing Legal Education', Oxford, All 
Souls College, 30 Aprill994, at 13. 
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. . k · th fora _ and parliamentarians 
.., rmal _ rubberstamping deciSions ta en m o er h 
1 !O h b t s ecific interests be t ey sectora or ;~~hei::n~o~~~;~:~ ~i~;:~~~~ :~~;~o:::~~~te~~;~cc~~~:r~~::e ~:1;~~~\!f 
WIS o m ded - both to determine the exact scope o 
needed -II should add, u~:n~lpyt~~s available to decision-makers, and their 
the prob em, to assess 1 nl "hard comparative look" efficiency in a given context. At all these leve s, o Y a . 'd 
will enable us to challenge a number of commonly perceived I eas. 
3. The Problem of the Level-of-Analysis 
Having stressed the importance . of comparative r~~e~~ch u:~~o:~~ 
:0~~~~~~~~;:~~ !U:~~e: ~~~~~~~y A!e~~!~~fc~~~~ems to ~e faced? 
My answer to this question is greatly influenced by the~ reflections of /6 
D ·d Singer who in a seminal essay written more than thirty years ago, d 
avi , , l t look at a given phenomenon, an :~~~e t~::~~~c~~s a~~~::ns~:~r~le;ra~e~odologi.cal i~plicati.onsi Al~?ug: 
his remarks were primarily concerned with his own field, mte~a~IO~Ja ~e a Ion , 
the problems he identified are common to a large number of diSCiplines. 
. h al ys several ways in which the phenomena 
"In any area of scholarly enqmry, t er~ ~e ;;a oses of systemic analysis. Whether in the 
under study may be sorted and arrange or P rp f on the arts or on the 
physical and social sciences, the observer may choos~ tofo~~:t:Jce, cho!e between the 
whole, upon the components or upon ~e s~stem. ~~ ~e~~ or the forest, the houses or the 
flowers or the garden, the rocks or ~ e q arry,. the Ie islators or the 
neighborhood, the cars or the traffic pmf the ddmqu~~~ ~: t~~ifea~1tficult gand may well lbegislativaec,eanntrdals~s~:~~~~]i~et~:~!~~i;li~: c~:C~r~~d. The complexity a~d significance. of 
ecome . d b th 1 ng standmg controversies 
these level-of-analysis decisions are r~ad!ly suggeste li{ -o~e~ted and culture-oriented 
between social psychology and sociology: pe~~o::mZ but a few In the vernacular of 
th 0 ology or micro- and macro-economics, · d 
an r p al, . th observer is always confronted with a system, its sub-systems, an f 
systems an ~SIS, e d h'le he may choose as his system any cluster o 
their respective environments, an w 1 . h · 'ts If such choice cannot 
phenomena from the most mmute ?rgams~ tot e.':mver~~71 e , merely be a function of whim or capnce, habit or famihanty. 
Decisions on the level at which to operate should accordingly be based on ~he 
~~~l~~~t~nc~~~c~!e~j;~~~~s.:V~~~;{d~: ~~~~8t~ t~i~~c~sf~i~l~~;~~;~:~si:: 
15 s p Norton "Parliaments: A Framework for Analysis" 13 West European Politics ee e.g. . , 
(1990) I. . 1 · , · K N rr and S Verba 16 "Th Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Re atwns , m · o . · 
e h · 1 Ess s (1961) 77 This essay was (eds) The International System: T eoretzca ay . . .d F . p /icy subs~~uently reprinted in J .. Ros~nau (ed.), International Polltzcs an orezgn o 
(1969) 20, to which the ensumg citations refer. 
17 Ibid. at 20-21. 
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account of the situation, as we will be in a position to encompass the totality of 
interactions which take place within the system and its environment. In contrast, 
this level of analysis tends to exaggerate the impact of the system upon the 
actors, as 
"there is a natural tendency to endow that upon which we focus with somewhat greater 
potential than it might normally be expected to have."l8 
L!kewise, as the focus _is on the whole system, little attention is generally paid to 
d1~feren~es of behavwur among component units. This often results in a 
u~Ifor:':uty postulate: ~11 ar~ dee_med to react in a similar fashion to given 
stim?h. Such a _b~havwurahst bias has long been apparent in international 
rel~tlons: where It I~ often assumed in a generic fashion that states pursue their 
natwnalmterest,19 mespective of the fact that both substantive interests and the 
procedure whereby they are defined may vary to a considerable extent from one 
~tate to the other .. In_ other words, although the system level has clear advantages 
m tern:s of descrzptwn, as many phenomena may be considered, its explanatory 
potential tends to be weaker. 
. In c~nt:ast, the unit level has the great advantage of permitting greater 
differ~ntia_twn among the specific features of each unit, as the latter can be 
exammed m ~r~ater detail. _As more variables may be included, the analysis can 
be more sophistlca~ed than If one operates at the system leveL Singer also argues 
that the umt level Is more congemal to comparative research the reason being 
that: ' 
"it is o~ly ~hen the actors are studied in some depth that we are able to make really valid 
generalizations ~f comparative nature. Although the systemic model does not necessaril 
preclude companso? and contrast amo~g the national subsystems, it usually eventuates i~ 
rather gross compansons based on relatively crude dimensions and characteristics."20 
Al~oug~ the_focus on the unit level is less likely to generate the same kind of 
u~ufon_mty bias as the system level, it may give rise to opposite types of 
dis_tortwn, such ~s a marked exaggeration of the differences among various 
um~s, or :Vhat Smger labels "Ptolemaic parochialism", i.e. the tendency to 
attnbute virtues to one's own country, and weaknesses to others.21 
Each kin~ o_f analysis therefore entails its own swag of problems. Singer's 
argument defmltely does not posrulate that one type would present decisive 
advantages over the other: each has its own strengths and weaknesses. However, 
18 Ibid. at 23. 
19 
PThe locus classicus here is Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Strugglefior 
ower and Peace, 6th ed. (1985). 
20 Ibid. at 24. 
21 Ibid. at 24. 
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scholars should acknowledge the implications that follow from the decision to 
operate at either level: · 
"the problem ... is one of realizing that there is this preliminary conceptual issue and that it 
must be resolved prior to any research undertaking."22 
Lastly, although they may occasionally focus on the same object, propositions 
worked out at different levels are not readily interchangeable. Being the product 
of different frames of analysis, they tend to reflect the bias of the level at which 
research has been conducted. Great caution should therefore be exerted before 
transfering analytical propositions from one level to another.23 Although 
Singer's remark was exclusively concerned with analytical statements, in my 
view it applies with even greater cogency when it comes to normative 
conclusion; I shall return to this point below. 
4. Some Methodological Issues 
The reader who will have followed me thus far may legitimately wonder 
what relevance, if any, the above remarks may have for comparisons between 
national and EC law. As a token of gratirude for his patience in enduring such 
abstract considerations, I will now attempt to illustrate potential applications of 
Singer's line of thought to the matter at issue. Naturally, my focus will be 
somewhat different. While Singer claims that shifts from one level to the other 
should preferably be avoided, because of the difficulties they entail, I would 
argue that, because of the evolution of Community law, European lawyers are 
under an increasing pressure to encompass in their analyses elements of national 
and Community law. However, the fact that they are not able to opt for one level 
does not mean that they can lightly ignore: Singer's methodological warnings. 
Quite to the contrary: they will face most of the difficulties identified by him. 
Several problems seem to deserve special attention: the comparability of 
instirutions operating at two distinct levels (4.1), the dependence relationship 
that may exist between different variables (4.2), the homogenization pressures 
that can often be noted in cross-level comparisons ( 4.3) and the difficulties 
involved in shifting from one level to the other (4.4). Having reviewed these 
issues, we will be in a better position to analyze the conflict by national and 
Community objectives and policies (4.5). 
4.1. The Comparability Issue 
It is often stated that comparisons should make use of comparable units of 
analysis. What may appear as a commonplace is but an application of a 
22 Ibid. at 28. 
23 Ibid. at 29. 
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fundam~ntal pri~ci~le, common to several research methods. Scientific 
explanatw~s consist 1~ the e.stablishment of general relationships among two or 
~ore van~,bles, .whtch will only be possible if all other variables are 
controlled , that IS to say held constant. As Lijphart has remarked: 
"[t]hese t~o elements are inseparable: one cannot be sure that a relationship is a true 0 
unless ~~e mfluence. of ?ther variables is controlled. The ceteris paribus condition is vi: 
to empmcal generahzattons."24 
Th~ focus on comparable institutions is thus one way to "control" a number ;f 
vanables. ~hat are comm?n to the institutions in question. But how is 
comparabtht~ to. be determmed? Experience suggests that one should avoid the 
trap ?f nommahs~. ~o~e often than not, commonality will be found in the 
functwns of these InstitutiOns: to be sure, institutions that hold similar functions 
can be termed comparable.25 · 
. ~lt~ough I would not subscribe to the view that these are the only 
mstttuti_ons that can possibly be compared,26 I am inclined to believe that 
compansons among !unctional equivalents are the most fruitful ones. The 
reaso~ should ?e easter to understand in the light of the above remarks. As 
f~nctwnal eqmvalents have a lot more in common than institutions united 
SI~ply by a common name or a common origin, the group of controlled 
vana?les tends to be larger. As a result, it is relatively easier to isolate a number 
a vanables that account for the differences between the units that are being 
compared. 
Suppose for _instance th~t I am interested in the functioning of second 
cham?ers. Even ~~ a co~panson between the British House of Lords and the 
~me~~a: Senate IS certaml~ possible, it would be likely to lead to conclusions 
0 b a_ tg degree of generality, the utility of which might be questioned For 
0 vwus reaso?s, SO?J:e ~ypical functions of the US Senate, the representati~n of 
~~affer States spectf~c Interests ?r the defe~ce of the institutional interests of all 
tates of the Umon, are without eqmvalent in the United Kingdom In 
~~tr~tS a comparison between second chambers in, say, Australia and. the 
n~te tates, should enable us to better assess the relative importance of 
vanab~es such as part_Y s~ctures or electoral systems,27 given that we would be 
focussmg on two mstttutwns that have been conceived to fulfil a similar role. 
24 Supra note II at 683. 
25 ~· Zwei-?ert and H. Kotz, lntr?duction ~o Comparative Law (I98); See also Rose 
26 Companng :orms of Comparative Analysts", Political Studies (199I) 445, at 448. ' See Constanttnesco, supra note I at 8I-86. 
27 F or _more detail on these issues, see Dehousse "La paradoxe de Madis . R 'fl · 
le role des chambres hautes dans les s stemes fed, " o~. e ~xwns sur 
science politique (I990) 643. y eraux • Revue du drmt pubhc et de la 
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Returning now to our initial problem, it can legitimately be asked if similar 
institutions can really be termed "comparable" if one operates at the national, 
and the other one at the Community, level. Surely, there are a number of such 
institutions. Yet, Singer's line of reasoning appears of great relevance here for 
there seems to be a clear relationship between what he defined as the level-of-
analysis problem and the differences, or even the tensions, that one may often 
note between the objectives pursued by national and Community policies. 
Let us take the case of environment policy. Initially, environmental 
protection was not mentioned among the objectives of the Community. Yet, it 
has emerged that differences among national policies were likely to hamper free 
movement, as a good produced in conformity with the regulatory requirements 
of country X might not satisfy those of country Y. Although the European Court 
of Justice has ruled that when national regulations had a clear impact on intra-
Community trade, they were to regarded as "measures of equivalent effect" 
prohibited by Article 30 of the EC Treaty,28 it has admitted that the protection 
of the environment may under certain conditions justify an exception to this 
prohibition.29 It has also recognized that it was legitimate for the Community to 
integrate environmental concerns in internal market directives,30 as the 
approximation of laws is the only avenue open to deal with the barriers to trade 
generated by differences among national regulations. 
Although environmental policy was raised to the level of a fully-fledged 
Community objective by the Single European Act, clear differences remain 
between national and Community policies, both at the level of objectives and at 
the level of instruments. Whereas the primary objective of national policies is to 
protect the environment, many Community measures are primarily inspired by 
another functional concern, namely to avoid that differences between national 
policies which hamper intra-Community trade. The instruments used by the 
Community are tailored to its objectives: harmonization of national laws, 
cooperation among national administrations, financial assistance to national 
policies, etc. In other words, because the Community happens to operate at a 
supra-national31 or, to use Singer's terminology, at a systemic level, its primary 
objectives and its modes of action tend to differ from those of national 
governments. 
Should we then conclude that because of these differences, national and 
Community policies cannot be compared? I would not think so because, as I 
indicated above, I do not believe that only functional equivalents can be 
28 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, ECR [1974] 837. 
29 Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, ECR [1988]4627. 
30 Cases 91 and 92/79, Commission v. Italy, ECR [1980] 1099 and 1115. See also case 
300/89, Commission v. Council (Titanium dioxide), ECR [1991-I] 2867. 
31 The word is used here in a non-technical sense, to suggest that the Community is acting 
beyond the national level. 
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compared. But the exercise presents a number of difficulties, which are 
generally not perceived fully or handled with sufficient care. 
For instance, it has recently been argued that Community law, with its 
emphasis on market integration, has had a "disintegrative" impact over national 
insurance policies, in the sense that it had made it difficult for the Member 
States to retain their traditional mode of regulating the insurance market.32 The 
criticism is no doubt correct. Yet, for the analysis to be complete, it is important 
to realize that the conflict is not necessarily due to a clash of politicar 
preferences, but that it is rather a direct product of the differences between the 
regulatory objectives pursued at each level: market integration for the 
Community, regulation of the insurance market at the national level. The nuance 
is of some importance: I shall argue below that structural conflicts of this kind 
can only be solved by trying to reconcile the key functional concerns of each 
level.33 At this stage, however, all I wish to note is that this example illustrates 
both the necessity and the dangers of comparisons between national and 
Community law. On the one hand, in the area of insurance regulation like in 
many others, it has become virtually impossible to understand the evolution of 
national law without taking into account developments at the Community leveL 
On the other hand, insufficient attention to the fundamental structural 
differences .that exist between the two levels is at the root of widespread 
methodological flaws. Too many analyses seem to take it for granted that 
objectives are identical or at least similar at both levels, or that normative 
conclusions can be transferred from one level to the other without resorting to 
the "translation" process advocated by Singer as a necessary prerequisite to any 
kind of cross-level comparison.34 
4.2. The Interdependence Issue 
. .co~parative analyses tend to presuppose the independence of the 
mstttutwns that are examined. In the words of Richard Rose, 
"[~]though states are tr~at~d as parts of the same universe, they are not seen as interacting 
With each other. Even 1f different states follow the same course of action, this is assumed 
to occur because of common internal characteristics. A country that has achieved certain 
socioeconomic prerequisites is deemed capable of adopting certain institutions, such as 
democracy, or certain levels of public expenditure. Whether the prerequisites are regarded 
as necessary or sufficient, what happens in each country is considered as independent of 
what happens elsewhere."35 
Just like the focu~ on. comparable elements, choosing units of analysis separated 
by clear boundanes ts but one way of tackling the control problem discussed 
32 M. Everson, Laws in Conflict- A Rationally Integrated Insurance Market?, PhD thesis 
on file at the European University Institute, Florence. 
33 Below, section 4.5. 
34 Supra, note 16 at 29. 
35 Rose, supra note 25 at 458. 
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above. By choosing independent units, the scholar endeavou~s ~o make sure that 
external variables will not make his analytical work more difficult. In contrast, 
when boundaries are permeated, the number of variables may bec~me s~ch that 
it becomes difficult to work out in a verifiable fashion the relatiOnships that 
exist among them. 
However, the focus on separate and independent ~nits may prove 
problematic. Not only are industrial societies in~reasingly mterdependent, as 
noted by Rose but this interdependence has at tlme taken a structured form. 
Such is undoubtedly the case of the European Community, which has been 
created to bring about "an ever closer union amon~ th~ peoples of Europe", as 
suggested in the preamble to the EC Treaty. ~onstdenng the fact that over the 
last few centuries states have become the mam producers of legal norms •. ~d 
that the latter have often been used to erect barriers among European po.hties, 
the removal of these barriers has been from the outset one of the pnmary 
objectives of the Community. Community law has therefore ass~med a centr.al 
role in the integration process. "Int~gration Throu~h Law:'- which was. as will 
be recalled the title of the Cappelettl/Seccombe/W etler senes - was not stmply a 
catchy label, but also an apt description of the changes under way in Europe. 
Leaving aside any corporatist pride, it might be argue? that this promine~ce 
of law in the integration process is somewhat problemattc for t?e compar~ttve 
lawyer. The dialectic relationship that exists between Commumty and natwnal 
law makes any attempt at a comparative synthesis an ardu~us t~sk.. On the one 
hand, national laws represent a necessary source of mspuatwn for the 
Community, and solutions worked out at European level often embody a 
compromise between different national traditions. ~n the ?ther ~and, the 
European Community, like any systemic <~ctor, often t~1es to dtrectly m~uence 
the policies pursued by its Member States, the typtcal ex~mple bem~ the 
harmonization process, in which it attempts to "approxtmat.e" natw~al 
regulations. Moreover, Community law may occasionally .com~ mt~ co~fltct 
with national legislation covering neighbouring, rather than Identical sttuatwns: 
national competition rules, for instance, may create obstacle.s to .the fr~e 
movement of goods,36 while bankruptcy legislation may conflict wtth basic 
rules of European company law.37 
In such cases, the analyst often finds himself in a difficult situation. There 
can be no question of keeping separate the units of analys~s : on. t~e contr~ry, 
cross-level comparisons should be explicitly concerned wtth their mteractwn, 
and try to encompass the two levels within one single analysis.38 Given the 
36 Case C-362/88, GB-Inno-BM, ECR [1990] 1667. 
37 Joined cases C-19/90 and 20/90, Karella v. OAE, ruling of 30 January 1991, not yet 
reported. 
38 A similar plea was recently made in relation to the European Court's rulings on priv~te 
law matters: the Court, it was argued, "must embrace that whole body of law m Its 
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number and the variety of variables involved, the exercise is far from easy. 
Moreover, as illustrated above, account should be made of the structural 
differences between the two levels, which increase the difficulty of the 
comparative exercise. These difficulties notwithstanding, it could be argued that 
the exercise is indispensable: in a complex situation, the analyst cannot simply 
assume a degree of simplicity that no longer exists.39 
4.3. The Homogeneization Issue 
We have seen that in Singer's view, research carried out at the level of the 
system is often characterized by a uniformity bias - all units are treated as if 
they reacted in a similar fashion to identical stimuli - and by a tendency to 
underestimate the wealth of variables that affect a given situation. This analysis 
seems borne out by many attempts to describe the complex functioning of the 
European Community. 
There_is.perhaps_J!()jJ~tter illustration of this tendency than the widespr~ad 
use -of the concept s>f natfona[iiiierest in the_ literature devoted to the 
Commtinitf Oneof the _filOSt. commonly_ accepted_yisiO:rl.S ofth~ Co_!llffiunity 
sees in the Member states the principal guardians of national Interests, and in the 
Courfcil-ofMinisters the forum where such interests are to be voiced and 
(li(}pefiiiiyYreconciled:4o Although. apparently unproolemaiic, this stateme~t 
~ides some highly questionable assiimptions. .. . .. .... . - . . . . 
It is far from clear, for instance, that all arrangements worked out at national 
level, no matter in what way, in fact correspond to some kind of comrtlon good: 
some categories of interest may have had a greater say than others in the final 
decision, which may be distorted in favour of their preferences. Think of the 
position of the French government in the recent Uruguay Round negotiations: 
the French Government's hard line, largely presented (including by the 
Government itself) as a fierce defence of the national interest, may have suited 
the interests of French farmers, who were by far the most vocal constituency, 
but it is doubtful that a failure of the negotiations would have proven beneficial 
to French consumers, or to exporting industries. Given the variety of interests 
involved, to talk of "France's national interest", as some did, is but a gross 
simplification. 
Equally puzzling is the implicit, but widespread assumption that, when 
acting at Community level, national governments out of necessity act to the best 
reasoning, even if this body consists for a large or major part of national law rules." 
(Samara-Krispis and Steindorff, case note in 29 CMLRev. (1992) 615 at 623). 
39 See also below, the remarks on the transposition issue. 
40 See e.g. Pescatore, "L'executif communautaire: Justification du quadripartisme institue 
par les traites de Paris et de Rome", Cahiers de droit europeen (1978) 387. 
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of their country's interest. Admittedly, when it refused to endorse the negotiated 
devaluation of the Sterling in the midst of the September 1992 monetary crisis, 
the British cabinet was convinced that it was acting in the interest of the 
country. Whether it actually did so is a matter for discussion. Seen in the same 
light, one might also question the wisdom of the unconditional acceptance by 
many Member States of the free movement of capital in 1988.41 Shortly before 
that crucial decision, it had been argued that in a system where macro-economic 
policies were not harmonized, an unlimited freedom to move capital from 
country to country would involve great risks for the stability of exchange 
rates.42 Later developments were to prove how accurate this assessment was; 
yet it was ignored by national governments. 
In other words, it seems somewhat naive to assume that whatever view 
defended by national representatives in Brussels will out of necessity correspond 
to some national interest: governments may be captured by specific, rather than 
general, interests; like anyinstitution, they have preferences and interests of 
fbeir own; like any individual, they_may make mistake~. This notwiThstanding; 
nntny'm'iaTyses of Community mstitutions and policies, being mainly concerned 
with the interaction among Member States, or between the latter and the EC, are 
naturally inclined to pay less attention to the way the national position is 
f?rrned; hence their tendency to take it for granted that governments act in the 
national interest. 
This, actually, is but one example of a general tendency to oversimplify the 
operation of the Community - a tendency which occasionally leads scholars to 
treat the Community as a legal system like any other. I shall now tum to this 
difficulty. 
4.4. The Transposition Issue 
It will be remembered that according to Singer, analyses carried out at 
different levels focus on different elements, and reflect distinct priorities. By 
way of consequence, they are not interchangeable: this is the reason for his 
assertion that one should not move lightly from one level to the other. So far, I 
have argued that although I found his analysis illuminating, cross-level 
comparisons are in my view useful, I would even say: necessary, at the current 
stage of development of our reflexions on the Community. For the 
demonstration to be complete, I must now deal with what I labelled the 
"transposition" problem: can one transfer analytical or normative concepts from 
one level to the other? 
41 Council Directive 88/361/EEC, of 24 June 1988, OJ N' L 178/5 of 8 July 1988. 
42 T. Padoa-Schioppa (ed.), Efficiency, Stability and Equity: A Strategy for the Evolution of 
the Economic System of the European Community (1987). 
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The question came to my mind when reading a classic of Community law, 
i.e. Judge Pescatore's description of the Community's institutional structure as a 
"quadripartite system". 
In this classical piece, Judge Pescatore tries to assess whether the concept of 
the separation of powers, that is to say the doctrine advocating that a clear line 
be drawn between the legislative, the executive and the judiciary power, which 
has inspired the constitution of many Western states since the 18th century, can 
be of some help in order to understand the institutional structure of the 
Community. He suggests that the answer to this question ought to be in the 
negative: 
"Ia doctrine "tripartite" de Ia separation des pouvoirs n'est pas un principe d'explication 
valable pour un ensemble transnational tel que les Communautes europeennes".43 
Although this statement might be open to objection, I am here more concerned 
with the treatment of the question than with the actual answer. Let us therefore 
review step by step the various stages of the reasoning. 
The starting point of his analysis is Article 4 of the EC Treaty which lists the 
institutions of the Community. At the time Pescatore was writing (1978), only 
four institutions were mentioned: the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Commission, and the Court of Justice. The learned author faces no difficulty in 
identifying the role of the Parliament and the Court. Both are entrusted by the 
Treaty with classical duties: representation of popular will for the Parliament, 
implementation of legal values ("materialisation des valeurs juri diques") for the 
Court of Justice.44 In contrast, the task is definitely more arduous as regards the 
Council and the Commission. 
As is well known, the former has elements in common with both legislative 
and executive bodies: although composed of representatives of the Member 
States, who in the domestic sphere belong to the executive power,45 it has a 
central part in all law-making procedures. Pescatore tries to combine these two 
elements by stressing that the Council's primary function is similar to that of a 
representative in international law: 
"[il] introduit dans le systeme communautaire tout ce que le systeme de Ia representation 
est capable de donner, c'est-a-dire une expression authentique de Ia volonte politique et 
juridique des Etats membres et !a capacite de lier ceux-ci en vertu de leur participation ... a 
Ia formation des actes du Conseil."46 
43 Pescatore, supra note 40 at 388. 
44 Ibid. at 394. 
45 Article 146 has since been modifified by the Maastricht Treaty to allow for a 
participation of representatives of subnational governments in the Council of Ministers. 
46 Ibid. at 391. 
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As for the Commission, he suggests that, in the Community setting, it is the 
institution that approximates most closely the traditional concept of an 
executive: although it does not enjoy all the prerogatives of most governments, 
the Commission, with its power of initiative and its role in the implementation 
of Community policies, has some of the features that traditionally belong to 
national executives.47 
As classical as such a description may seem, one may wonder whether it 
actually gives a complete account of the Community's institutional setting. 
Adopting a clearly functional reading of the separation of powers in lieu of the 
institutional approach used by Pescatore, and trying to analyse how the 
traditional functions of government are allotted within the Community system, 
one might reach different conclusions. 
To understand fully the working of legislative procedures, for instance, it 
ought to be appreciated that although the Commission enjoys a monopoly of 
legislative initiative in a number of Community policies, the exercise of this 
right is greatly conditioned both by the existence of the European Council, 
which can invite the Commission to submit proposals to the Council, and by the 
pressures exerted by national capitals. A survey recently conducted by the 
Commission has evaluated that in 1991, some 21% of the proposals put forward 
by the Commission's were introduced following a direct request from the 
Council or one member State.48 Likewise, if the Commission plays a pivotal 
role in the implementation of a number of Community policies, such as 
competition or anti-dumping policies, in many other areas its "executive" 
powers are significantly constrained by the complex comitology machinery, set 
up to ensure that Member States do not relinquish all power at this level. 
Moreover, as a rule, the application of C:>mmunity law to private persons is 
generally taken care of by national administrations. Lastly, although the Court 
of Justice and the Tribunal of First Instance are traditionally depicted as the 
Community Judiciary, one should not forget that a about half of the cases 
handled by the Court of Justice are referred to it by national jurisdictions, using 
the preliminary rulings mechanism established by Article 177 of the EC Treaty. 
It seems therefore proper to regard national Courts as "ordinary Community 
jurisdictions" ("juge communautaire de droit commun"), as suggested by a 
former President of the European Court.49 
Taken together, the above remarks give a far more complex image of the 
Community's institutions than the classic framework depicted by Judge 
Pescatore.50 All point to the same fundamental element, that is to say to the 
47 Ibid. at 393. 
48 SEC (92) 1879, 8 October 1992. 
49 R. Lecourt, L'Europe des juges (1976). 
50 See further Cassese, "La Costituzione europea", XI Quaderni Costituzionali (1991) 487 
for an even more contrasted approach. 
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central role of national institutions in the Community machinery. How can one 
explain the fact that such a central element was not given more importance in 
classical descriptions of the Community's institutions? 
In part, the contrast between the two analyses is a product of divergent 
approaches. The classical analysis rests on the implicit premise that each 
institution embodies a different function- or, better said, a different "power", in 
the sense that Montesquieu would have used this term - whereas the above 
remarks are inspired by a functional concern, i.e. the desire to analyze h;cwhich 
institutions and how a given function is perforrne~. But one might also argue 
that the relative weakness of the classical analysis stems from the way it has 
attempted to transpose at the systemic (Community) level, a concept (the trias 
politica) worked out at national level. As hinted above, I am not of the view that 
such a transposition is impossible, nor do I believe that it should be avoided. But 
the difficulty of the operation should not be underestimated; in particular, one 
should be aware that functional needs may vary greatly: from one level to the 
In liberal constitutions, the principal function of the separation of powers, 
epitomized by the writings of Montesquieu and Madison, was to protect 
political freedom. As the latter argued, 
"the concentration of [all power] in the same hands is precisely the definition of despotic 
government".51 
In contrast, there is little evidence that similar concerns played any meaningful 
role in the carving of relationships among Community institutions. The division 
of labour among them, and the various 'checks and balances' enshrined in the 
treaties were motivated by another concern: namely to prevent an excessive drift 
of power towards an autonomous institution like the EC Commission! A sheer 
power logic, rather than liberal political philosophy, seems to have ~ided the 
drafters of the EC Treaty. 
It was even more pervasive in the evolution of the living constitution of the 
Community, which as is known, saw the development of intergovernmental 
bodies.52 
Returning to Singer's terminology, one could explain the situation of the 
European Community by saying that being a "systemic" actor, it had to face a 
number of systemic necessities unknown in most national systems, like the 
necessity to somehow associate its component states to the exercise of its 
various functions. This example clearly shows that when comparing the two 
51 The Federalist, ed. by C. Rossiter (1961), no48, 310. 
52 Weiler, "The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism", 1 Yearbook 
of European Law (1981) 267. 
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levels, a mechanical transposition at Community level of concepts and 
institutions developed at national level should be ruled out. 
Such a caveat ~eems necessary, for cross-level analysis is frequently 
resorted to unconsciOusly. Another example can be found in the widespread 
~~~dency to dep!~t Co~munity mechanism_s as unnecessarily complex. The 
ptllars structure · established by the Maastncht Treaty, for instance, has been 
gene_rally criticized for its extreme complexity, especially as regards external 
relations: _why s~par~te trade probl~ms - to be dealt with by the Community -
from foreign pohcy tssues or from Immigration matters, which will be debated 
in an intergovernmental framework. 53 
I am not trying to suggest that such a separation is justified; the system is 
un?ou?tedly complex - so much so that one may question its viability. But my 
p_omt lS another one: when attempting to evaluate Community mechanisms, 
stght should not be lost of the fact that the Community, because it is a systemic 
body, has to accommodate a number of requirements which are without 
~quivalent in national systems: Should one tum to other divided-power systems 
hke federal states, ?n~ would fr~quently _notice a similar level of complexity, 
brough~ about by stmllar necesslttes. Thts by no means precludes a negative 
evaluatiOn, ~or feder~l ~y~tems too have often been criticized for the high degree 
of comrlextty and ngtdtty they display.54 But whatever their outcome, both 
comp~nson and evalu~tion should be carried~ outkeeping ih mind that the same 
yardsticks should not lightly be used for the Community as for classical nation-
sta~es. A fortiori, ~)'~n greater caution is required for normative judgments 
denved form our study of national systems. 
4.5. Comparison and Conflict 
So far, my concerns have been mainly analytical; I have tried to make sense 
o~ the difficu~ties ~nvolved in cross-level comparisons. I have argued that this 
kmd of ex~rc1se dtffers from "ordinary" comparisons, in that the Community 
and the natiOnal _levels ~o~ld n_ot be treate? as water-tight compartments: very 
often, Commumty pohctes a1m at shapmg the behaviour of the Member 
State~.55 We ha~e also seen that the Community, being a systemic actor, .bas 
functiOnal reqmrements that are unknown in national legal systems. Put 
together, these two elements suggest that there may be instances of conflicts 
between the two levels. 
53 See "Editorial Comments- Post Maastricht", 29 CML Rev. (1992) 199. 
54 See e.g. the classical criticism of H.Laski, "The Obsolescence of Federalism", The New 
Republic, May 3, 1939, 367. 
55 Supra, section 4.2. 
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Let us return for a moment to the tension between national and Community 
regulatory objectives, to which I referred earlier. Being primarily concerned 
with market integration, the Community has tried to eliminate obstacles to trade 
created by national regulations. In some areas the emphasis has been laid on 
harmonization as a means of eliminating divergences among national laws; in 
other areas, the Treaty rules prohibiting discriminatory behaviour have been 
construed broadly, so as to remove barriers to free movement.56 
In all these cases, whenever Community objectives conflicted with national 
priorities, the supremacy doctrine has ensured the prevalence of the former over 
the latter. And the Court has made abundantly clear that supremacy is an 
essential structural requirement of the Community. To quote Costa v. ENEL : 
"The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another in 
deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the 
objectives of the Treaty ... The obligations undertaken under the Treaty would not be 
unconditional, but merely contingent, if they could be called in question by subsequent 
legislative acts of the signatories".57 
Thus, using Singer's terms, one could say that the functional concerns of the 
systemic level (market integration and supremacy) have been given precedence 
over that of the unit (Member State) level. Such a formulation has the merit of 
stressing the dangers involved in this kind of situation. Indeed, it could be 
argued that what we have are instances of conflicts between two legal orders, 
solved with a conflict rule - the supremacy principle -borrowed to one of them. 
Yet, one could ask, why should the concerns of one level prevail over that of the 
other? It seems clear that such a situation bears in itself the seeds of future 
conflicts. The problem of legitimacy is particularly acute when expansionist 
interpretation of Community law collide with areas of national law that have not 
been harmonized. 58 Lack of attention for the legitimate concerns of national 
societies may lead them-fo challenge the supremacy rule ifthe latter is perceived 
as a factor of disruption of national traditions and interests.59 
Naturally, this is not to say that the priority should simply be reversed, and 
an absolute preference given to the regulatory concerns of the Member States. 
Why think in binary terms? If one accepts that the functional concerns of both 
lt:vels are equally legitimate, the key question then becomes how they can be 
56 See e.g. the Inno case, supra note 36 The Court of Justice has however adopted a more 
cautious position in the Keck case (jointed cases C-267 and C-268/91, Keck and 
Mithouard, ruling of 24 November 1993, not yet reported). 
57 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 585. 
58 Samara-Krispis and Steindorff, supra note 38 at 662. 
59 See e.g. Everson, supra note 32. In this respect, it is worth noting that in a recent opinion 
poll, only a minority (23%) of the persons asked answered that they would be willing to 
comply with a decision of the European Court of Justice if it would hurt their 
convictions. Gibson and Caldeira, "The European Court of Justice: A Question of 
Legitimacy", Zeitschriftfiir Rechtsoziologie 2!93, 205 at 218. 
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reconciled. It is suggested that this result will be achieved only if both concerns 
are given equal importance at the systemic level, i.e. through the development at 
Comirn.lnity level of policies that give due consideration to the regulatory I 
concerns of the Member states.60 The difficulties of this approach should not be__, 
underestimated: national priorities may differ greatly, and the Member States 
have given ample evidence of their growing uneasiness in the face of the growth 
of Community powers. Yet this seems to be the only way to avoid a clash 
between the concerns of both levels. 
Assuredly, comparative analysis will have an important part to play in this 
reconciliation process. Attention will have to focus on the objectives pursued by 
nationahegulations, and on the techniques used to reach these objectives. The 
coherence of national legal systems will have to be preserved. The same could 
be said about judicial interpretation. Commenting upon recent rulings of the 
European Court of Justice in the field of company law, Samara-Krispis and 
Steindorff have suggested that 
"[ w ]here provisions of a directive collide with institutions of national law which have not 
been harmonized, interpretation should not be satisfied with the argument that Community 
law supersedes national law. It should aim at a reconciliation of the directive with national 
law in order to safeguard the coherence of legal. institutions. This presupposes that the 
interpretation of directives must be handled with great care and on the basis of an 
exhaustive study of nationaL.. law.61 
Likewise, it has been suggested that, having regard to the growth of tensions 
between Community law and national constitutional values, the Court should 
draw its inspiration from national rules whenever it mllst intervene in such a 
conflict.62 Thus, both at the level of law-making,and ofjudicial interpretation, 
C_<:>!!lparatLve ai1alysisseerns to be called upon to play an increasing part. 
4. Conclusion: Towards a Comparative Era in Community Law? 
So far, the study of the European Community has been greatly influenced by 
its origin as an international organization. The first to tum their attention to the 
new structure were international lawyers in law faculties and international 
relations scholars in political science departments. Even now, in most 
universities, the teaching of Community law is often associated with 
international law, It is beyond doubt that this intellectual backgroundhas 
influenced our understanding of the Community. The attention devoted to the 
relations between the national and the Community legal orders, for instance, is 
60 I have developped this argument in "Integration v. Regulation? On the Dynamics of 
Integration in the European Community" XXX Journal of Common Market Studies 
(1992) 383. 
61 Supra note 38 at 622; emphasis in the original. 
62 "Droit communautaire et valeurs constitutionnelles nationales", Droits n" 1~ (1991)_81-at.-
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clearly linked to its origin as an international organization, even if it was rapidly 
perceived as an a-typical creature. 
The Community has now developed its activities in an ever-growing number 
of fields. National and Community law have become intertwined in a complex 
web of relationships. This evolution is reflected in the academic sphere: scholars 
specialized in economic law have long known that they could not ignore 
developments at Community level; labour lawyers have rapidly followed suit; 
civil lawyers have recently become aware of the creeping 'Europeanization' of 
their discipline; constitutional lawyers have been provoked by the Maastricht 
Treaty to ask to what extent traditional concepts such as the state or national 
sovereignty still hold some currency. 
As the Community has enlarged the scope of its activities, it has come 
across new problems. Nowhere is this trend clearer than in the field of internal 
market legislation. Conceived initially to eliminate barriers to trade, it has been 
gradually called upon to address problems ranging from health, to the 
environment, and consumer protection. However, as Community intervention in 
these areas developed, the limits of the harmonisation model, largely based on a 
legislative approach, have appeared more clearly.63 If the Community has to 
address effectively regulatory problems of this kind, new techniques will have to 
be worked out to provide a framework for the cooperation between the 
Community and the Member States. Concepts such as direct effect and 
supremacy, which played a cri:ICiarrole iri the infant stage of the Community,64 
do not offer a satisfactory response to these new kinds of problem. Nor do they 
hold a solution to hot political issues such as the ,democracy deficit, or the 
waning of State sovereignty which have emerged in response to the revival of 
the integration process. 
In contrast, comparative analysis can make an important contribution to our 
understanding of the Community and to the solution of many problems it is 
currently faced with. It can also help Community lawyers, which have rarely 
been inclined to question commonly received ideas, to adopt a more distantiated 
stance .. There are therefore reasons to believe - and to hope - that comparative 
research will play an increasing role in reflexions on the Community. This 
evolution may be seen as a sign of maturity, a corollary of the Community's 
transformation from an international organization into a more elaborate form of 
political system. Yet it is not devoid of problems. This article has argued that 
cross-level comparisons gave rise to a number of methodological difficulties. It 
is only by addressing these difficulties that scholars will be able to improve our 
understanding of the Community. 
63 R. Dehousse, C. Joerges, G. Majone and F. Snyder, in collaboration with M. Everson, 
Europe after 1992- New Regulatory Strategies, EUI Working Paper Lawn' 92/31. 
64 The metaphor is borrowed to Pescatore, "The Doctrine of "Direct Effect": An Infant 
Disease of Community Law", 8 European Law Review (1983) 155. 
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